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Introduction
Expropriation of land removes the main 
foundation upon which people’s productive 
systems, commercial activities, and 
livelihoods are constructed. This is the 
principal form of de-capitalization and 
pauperization of displaced people, as they 
lose both natural and man-made capital. 
(Cernea 2000:13)
In Timor-Leste over 75 per cent of the 
population depends on land for food production. 
Land is the most fundamental economic asset 
available to most households; it is crucial not 
only to food and market production but also 
non-commodity resources such as housing, 
firewood, grazing and medicine. With 41 per 
cent of the population living below the poverty 
line of US$0.88 per day and only 36 per cent of 
Timorese households considered food secure, many 
households live in what can be classed as extreme 
vulnerability (World Bank 2012). In this context 
and with few formal employment opportunities, 
land supports a subsistence economy which feeds 
most of the population.
This Discussion Paper anticipates the potential 
impacts and impoverishment risks of the Suai 
Supply Base Project in Timor-Leste, paying 
particular attention to the project’s likely gendered 
impacts and the evolving tensions between the 
state’s powers to expropriate land and customary 
land access. In doing so it draws on Cernea’s 
framework for identifying the impoverishment risks 
of large-scale land acquisitions (Cernea 1997, 2000) 
and Behrman et al.’s (2012) analysis of the gender 
implications of large-scale land deals. The first 
section describes patterns of land access and the 
vulnerability and dependency of local communities 
on land. The second section details the politics 
of the Suai Supply Base and the process of land 
acquisition. This is followed by discussion of some 
of the potential impacts that the land acquisition 
may have on local communities in Suai.
In land-dependent societies, research suggests 
that land alienation and evictions can have 
serious and negative impacts on communities. 
Michael Cernea (2000) includes among these 
risks landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalisation, food insecurity, increased 
morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common 
property and services, and social disarticulation. 
He states that ‘the most widespread effect of 
involuntary displacement is the impoverishment of 
considerable numbers of people’ (ibid.:2).
Behrman et al. (2012) state that an in-depth 
understanding of the local context (including 
production roles and responsibilities, and access 
to and control of land) is a necessary starting 
point for understanding how any large-scale land 
appropriation will likely affect local women and 
men. The authors state, ‘of utmost importance is the 
issue of who in the community has land rights and 
how gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, or other 
distinguishing factors may influence these rights’ 
(2012:4). They argue that this analysis must include 
a nuanced understanding of land use patterns 
(including important cultural and spiritual uses), 
gendered agricultural roles, statutory and customary 
land access and rights, state and non-state decision-
making over land, and the types of available 
human capital.
Timor-Leste’s highly ambitious Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030 (RDTL 2011) is 
focused around the petroleum 
industry. The US$1.3 billion Tasi 
Mane South Coast Development 
Project, which includes three 
large-scale developments in Suai, 
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Betano and Viqueque, is the cornerstone of this 
Strategic Development Plan. The Tasi Mane mega-
project — which includes a supply base, industrial 
estate, airport and new town at Suai; a refinery, 
petrochemical plant and new city ‘Nova Betano’ at 
Betano; a liquefied natural gas plant, airport and 
new town at Beacu; and a 155-kilometre highway 
linking all three sites — will require significant 
expropriation of land along the south coast.
This paper is based on a literature review; 
analysis of project documents, media releases and 
social media; discussions with civil society groups; 
and limited fieldwork and participant observation 
during 2015. As such it cannot provide a complete 
analysis of the impacts of the project but attempts 
to sketch the broad impacts and suggests avenues 
for further research.
Vulnerable Access and Rights to Land in 
Timor-Leste
Dependency on Land
In Timor-Leste sociality, family, community and 
other social networks are heavily place based and 
dependent on connections with the land. Timorese 
social identity is constructed around the notion 
of origin (Fitzpatrick et al. 2012; Fox 1993; Fox 
and Sather 1996; McWilliam 2003, 2007a, 2007b; 
Reuter 2007), with the physical construction of the 
uma lulik (sacred house) and social construct of the 
uma lisan (house of origin) as fundamental units of 
identity. The significance of these house structures 
throughout Timor-Leste is evidenced by various 
studies: among the Mambai of Aileu (Traube 1986), 
the Makasai of Baucau (Forman 1980), the Kemak 
of Bobonaro (Renard-Clamagirand 1982) and the 
Naueti of Viqueque (Barnes 2011).
Daniel Fitzpatrick estimates that 97 per cent 
of land in Timor-Leste is governed by customary 
mechanisms (Fitzpatrick 2002). Within these 
origin groups land is fundamental to social identity 
and the local worldview. Do Amaral de Carvalho 
(n.d.) suggests that in Timor-Leste land has seven 
dimensions: ‘land gives us our identity, it has 
social and cultural dimensions and is important 
for sharing resources amongst families. Land is the 
basis of our local economy and of our ecology, it 
gives life and shelter to us all.’
Land is also the most fundamental economic 
asset available to the vast majority of households 
along the south coast. Access to these place-based 
social networks that are embedded in land is 
fundamental to the livelihoods and identity of both 
men and women, and acts as a safety net in times 
of hardship. Development processes which do not 
develop either a deeper understanding of customary 
land issues or an understanding of how customary 
institutions may in some respects be protecting 
vulnerable men’s and women’s access to land run 
the risk of further impoverishing and increasing 
the vulnerability of local communities (Behrman 
et al. 2012).
The Lords of the Land
Closely dependant on rainfall and the fertility 
of the soil for the continued viability of their 
economically marginal existence, those who 
inhabit the districts of East Timor believe 
strongly in the need to maintain excellent 
relations with, to act in accordance with the 
wishes of, and to appease where necessary — 
their ancestors. (Hohe and Nixon 2003:11)
Despite almost 500 years of colonialism 
and 24 years of occupation and military rule 
by Indonesia, the importance of the rai nain 
(variously translated as ancestors, landowners or 
‘lords of the land’) to Timorese life should not be 
underestimated. The entire ‘social-cosmos’ (Hohe 
and Nixon 2003:10) can only be examined in 
relation to the supremacy of a mythical ancestor 
who opened the land and is seen as the most 
significant element of the social order. It is the uma 
lisan of this apical ancestor that retains spiritual 
and ritual authority over the land. According to 
Fitzpatrick et al. this authority is sustained by their 
‘cultural knowledge of the history of the founding 
ancestors, the establishment of sacred houses, and 
land allocations and alliances involving subsequent 
settler and neighbouring groups’ (2012:32–33).
Today the term rai nain has multiple legal, 
physical and spiritual meanings. In its simplest 
literal form it means the landholder or owner 
but the conflation of this with western meanings 
of ‘freehold landowner’ has confused discourse 
and hidden the deeper meanings. Rai nain more 
importantly refers to the descendants or entire clan 
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who are descendant from an apical ancestor. In a 
more abstract sense the rai nain is the mythological 
ancestor who must be consulted by the ritual elders 
on (preferably before) any decisions regarding the 
land and the people. In dealings over land this 
concept is rarely truly taken on board by national-
level or international actors who find it difficult to 
conceive of a dead ancestor who has agency and 
potent power to make decisions over their lives.
In this sense the western-imbued notion of rai 
nain (as freehold owner) is ontologically opposed 
to the spirit notion of rai nain. Where land is 
formally sold to an outsider he will never become 
a rai nain in the spiritual sense. He may be allowed 
to use the land for long periods of time, perhaps 
even permanently, but he will always be subject to 
the whims of the real rai nain and his continuing 
access depends on his spiritual relationships, his 
ability to appease the real rai nain and maintain 
social relationships with the descendants of the 
rai nain.
This does not mean that reaching 
accommodations over land use is impossible. 
Multiple examples show the great flexibility of these 
social structures to accommodate various land use 
arrangements, be it through marriage (Barnes 2011; 
Fitzpatrick et al. 2012; Sahlin 1985), adoption, 
stranger king mythologies (Fitzpatrick et al. 2012; 
Hagerdal 2012; Pannell 2006), juramentu (oaths) 
(Do Amaral de Carvalho 2011; Fitzpatrick and 
Barnes 2010; Fitzpatrick et al. n.d.) and temporary 
decisions (Thu 2012).
Society is held together by complex networks 
of alliance, formed and solidified by marriage. The 
majority of the ethno-linguistic groupings across 
the country are patrilineal, with the exceptions 
of the matrilineal Bunak-speaking groups in the 
south-west, Tetum–Terik-speaking groups along 
the central south coast and central highlands 
and Galoli-speaking groups of Manatuto on the 
north coast. Social identity and exchange patterns 
are defined through the relationships of Umane 
(wife giving houses) and Feto-saa(n) (wife taking 
houses). These two types are seen to play mutually 
enforcing roles, pledged to provide security and 
fertility to each other.
While these concepts are fundamental to the 
spiritual balance and identity of an origin group, 
in the more concrete world of land expropriation, 
livelihoods and cash flow the still living ‘rai nain’ 
or representatives of the ancestral rai nain have 
significant power over land and decision-making 
at the local level. Within the hierarchical local 
structure it can be very difficult if not dangerous to 
question the rai nain or other traditional leaders. 
Furthermore, within patrilineal kinship structures 
it is very difficult for the Feto-saa(n) to criticise or 
speak out against their Umane. Facing expropriation 
or sale of land, these structures can leave certain 
groups and individuals within the family and 
community in particularly vulnerable positions.
Gender Aspects of Land Vulnerability
While Suai is home to the predominantly 
matrilineal Bunak and Tetum Terik ethno-linguistic 
groups it should not be understood that women 
necessarily have stronger rights to land than men. 
In policy arenas it is often reductively presented 
that ‘women have rights to land in Suai’ or, even 
more problematically, that Suai social groups are 
matriarchal and therefore women make all decisions 
regarding land. Neither contention reflects reality, 
as Thu et al. (2007:242) point out ‘there is a need 
to destabilise the conception that “patrilineal” 
and “matrilineal” societies are opposite ends of 
the spectrum when it comes to accessing land’. 
This they argue ‘will make visible the vast array of 
descent principles that truly exist, which otherwise 
would be marginalised and ignored’.
Thu et al. (2007) find that both patrilineal and 
matrilineal land tenure systems in Timor-Leste 
exhibit a high degree of flexibility and that both 
men and women acquire land rights under many 
different circumstances. In the absence of coherent 
state welfare or support to vulnerable households 
this flexibility has essentially provided social 
support structures that operate across much of 
Timor-Leste. While in Bunak-speaking groups men 
predominantly ‘marry in’ and move to the woman’s 
family land, on the ground the issue is complicated 
by adaptations to modern land pressures, flexible 
marriage arrangements and a complex history of 
colonialism, occupation and displacement. Analysis 
of the Suai Supply Base project and other land-
intensive mega-projects suggests that the flexible 
accommodations described by Thu et al. (2007) 
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are coming under significant strain due to the 
expropriation of community land for state-driven 
large-scale development programs and may in 
many cases be aggravating social vulnerability.
Irrespective of local land-inheritance customs, 
patriarchy is manifested in Timorese society in 
a number of ways. In general, women are not 
afforded the same access to and control over 
resources, agency and achievements as men. 
Moreover, women and girls suffer more from 
malnutrition than men and boys (World Food 
Programme 2006:66–68), women fall significantly 
behind men at all levels of education — especially 
secondary and tertiary levels (Ministry of Finance 
2011:73), and rank significantly lower than men in 
literacy rates (World Bank 2008). A forthcoming 
Asia Foundation report states that ‘gender bias 
and economic vulnerability continue to result in 
structural barriers that: economically and socially 
“contain” women in the domestic sphere and 
limit their mobility while undermining women’s 
practical capacity to leave relationships where 
domestic violence is occurring’ (Grenfell et al. 
2015:10). As such, Timorese women are land 
vulnerable both as women within male-dominated 
households and as members of vulnerable social 
classes and communities at risk of land alienation.
Statutory Recognition of Land Rights
Thirteen years after independence, Timor-Leste 
has no land policy or legislation which clarifies 
the rights of landowners, communities or the 
powers of the state to alienate land. Successive 
donor-funded projects have failed to facilitate the 
creation of a functioning land administration. A 
fragile legal system and the lack of legal aid services 
have left many land claimants in highly vulnerable 
situations.
Article 54 of the Timor-Leste constitution 
contains a basic protection of private property 
and a vague article stating that property should 
not be used to the detriment of its social purpose 
(Article 54.2). While Article 54.3 clearly states 
that ‘expropriation of property for public purposes 
shall only take place following fair compensation 
in accordance with the law’, the government 
has frequently ignored this protection and 
increasingly carried out evictions with little or 
no compensation, often citing national economic 
development as grounds for evictions and state land 
acquisition. The Timor-Leste constitution provides 
no protection to customary land other than Article 
2.4 which stipulates that ‘the State shall recognise 
and value the norms and customs of East Timor 
that are not contrary to the Constitution and to any 
legislation dealing specifically with customary law’.
Drafting land legislation and balancing the 
many interests in land has always been a difficult 
act. The state has repeatedly attempted to both 
guarantee state access to large amounts of ‘private 
state land’ and to entrench strong state powers of 
expropriation. Many key state officials and Dili-
based elites hold to the notion that ‘empty’ land is 
state land, and ignore the origin-based claims of 
customary land holders (Cryan 2015a).
A package of three draft laws1 aiming to resolve 
recognition of ownership rights in Timor-Leste 
were prepared by the state in 2008 but have met 
with significant controversy and dissent (Cryan 
2015c). While on one hand the laws have been 
criticised by civil society on human rights grounds 
for not recognising community land rights and 
giving strong powers to the state to alienate land 
without sufficient protections to communities, 
it is also likely that under pressure to acquire 
large amounts of land for economic development 
projects, the Government of Timor-Leste finds the 
compensation provisions of the laws too onerous 
(Cryan 2015b).
Without land legislation, the legal situation for 
communities remains highly unclear. In an effort 
to speed up the acquisition process for the Suai 
Supply Base project without resolving the broader 
issues of legal uncertainty, the state drafted specific 
legislation for the alienation of the land required for 
the supply base (Decree Law 36/2014 approved in 
December 2014). The use of this type of piecemeal, 
case-based legislation leaves communities in 
a situation of much uncertainty and affords 
significant power to the state.
Land Administration, Titles and the National 
Cadastre
In 2008, the Government of Timor-Leste with 
support from USAID established the Ita Nia 
Rai (our land) program, aimed at creating a 
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functioning land administration that included 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the registration 
of 50,000 land claims and the drafting of a series 
of land laws that would lay down the hierarchy of 
landownership recognition. This process mapped 
claims to land in urban and peri-urban areas which 
did not include the land allocated for the Suai 
Supply Base.
In 2011, prior to any public consultation or 
information about the Suai Supply Base project, 
the National Directorate of Land, Property and 
Cadastral Services (Direcção Nacional de Terras, 
Propriedades e de Serviço Cadastrais), then 
Secretariat of State for Natural Resources and the 
national petroleum company Timor Gap carried 
out a separate survey of the land required for the 
project. This process was loosely based on the Ita 
Nia Rai processes but was largely unmonitored by 
civil society at the local level. It is unclear to what 
extent local people understood the implications 
of this survey process for compensation and 
negotiation. Yosef Nahak Kehik, Chefe Aldeia 
of Fatusin, Suco Kamanasa, is quoted by non-
government organisation La’o Hamutuk in late 
2012 as stating ‘So far, we don’t yet know the 
results of the government’s work to collect data 
about people’s property which they will take’ 
(La’o Hamutuk 2015). During fieldwork in 2015 a 
number of households that had already received 
compensation were unsure of the size of their 
lands, suggesting that dissemination of information 
during the survey process was weak and that 
communities had little access to legal support and 
information during the compensation process.
The Suai Supply Base
The Suai Supply Base, part of the larger Tasi Mane 
South Coast Development Project, is a logistics 
support base and port to be used to support 
offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration and 
production activities. Tasi Mane developments in 
Suai include a supply base, an industrial estate, 
airport, a new town called Nova Suai and the 
first phase of the 155-kilometre highway that will 
link the site to other petroleum development and 
processing sites in Betano and Beacu.
The Petroleum Development Paradigm
The crucial context for the Suai Supply Base is 
the huge commitment of consecutive Timorese 
governments to petroleum-based development. 
Timor-Leste’s highly ambitious Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030 envisages Timor-
Leste becoming a middle-income country in 
15 years’ time with development highly focused 
around the petroleum industry. The Tasi Mane 
South Coast Development Project is the cornerstone 
of this Strategic Development Plan. As well as the 
developments in Suai, the US$1.3 billion mega-
project includes other large-scale developments 
in Betano and Viqueque, including a refinery, 
petrochemical plant and new city at Betano; a 
liquefied natural gas plant, airport and new town 
at Beacu; and a 155-kilometre highway linking all 
three sites.
Arguments in favour of the project centre 
on the need for national economic development. 
However, the promised economic benefits of this 
project are contested. For example, in its 2013 
submission to parliament, La’o Hamutuk states, 
‘frankly, we do not believe the high rates of return 
claimed for the Tasi Mane project’ (La’o Hamutuk 
2013). Multiple La’o Hamutuk reports argue that 
this is a dubious and highly risky investment in 
Timor-Leste’s future (La’o Hamutuk 2015).
Successive governments led by Xanana Gusmão 
have insisted that piping oil from the Timor Sea to 
Timor-Leste is the most economically beneficial 
option for Timor-Leste. This has become a divisive 
issue in Timor-Leste with those opposed to the 
Tasi Mane project being accused of being anti-
nationalist, aligned with outside interests and of 
undermining the state for political or economic 
gain. Despite having resigned his position as 
prime minister, under the new Unity Government 
Xanana Gusmão has stepped into a new role as 
Minister for Planning and Strategic Investment and 
has essentially retained control over the strategic 
investment portfolio and thus the Tasi Mane 
project. As such we are unlikely to see any major 
policy changes relating to this development project.
Construction has already begun on the first 
phase of the project in Suai, which will occupy well 
in excess of 1113 hectares. Conservative estimates 
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suggest that the supply base will cost the state more 
than US$781 million.
The first phase of this project has involved 
expropriation of land for both the airport and the 
first and second phases of the port and supply 
base. The only publicly available maps showing 
affected areas are from the environmental impact 
assessment carried out by WorleyParsons in 2012 
(WorleyParsons 2012). Land survey maps produced 
by the Government of Timor-Leste and detailing 
the scale and location of land expropriations are not 
publicly available. However, field research in March 
2015 confirmed that land acquired for the airport 
stretches further to the east and west than what is 
shown in the environmental impact assessment.
Land clearance and building work has 
commenced for the airport, which affects 
approximately 170 households. Contractors have 
cleared the land for the airport but have stopped 
short of clearing any houses in Holbelis (east of the 
airport) and Lohorai (west of the airport) as they 
are waiting for the government to finish building 
alternative housing for affected communities. Land 
needed for the first and second phases of the Suai 
Supply Base has been cleared. Phase one affects 
144 parcels of land, mostly farming land but also 
some housing and field shelters. Phase two affects 
over 250 households.
The number of households affected by the 
highway remains unclear but the state has carried 
out an initial survey marking affected households 
with red spray paint. The road will run through 
the villages of Debos, Ogues, Labarai, Beco, 
Tashilin and Raimean before continuing on into 
Manufahi District.
Process
Pressure to access land for petroleum development 
quickly and easily has led to a fast-paced 
acquisition process. A government press release 
celebrating the transfer of land for the project 
claims that the agreement ‘comes after a long 
process of consultation with the local community 
over several years and bears testament to the 
commitment of the Government to balance their 
pro-business and investment policy with a genuine 
care for the welfare of the local people and their 
environment’ (RDTL 2013). However, fieldwork 
in 2015 suggests that few community members 
feel that they were consulted. Many see the 
process as characterised by a lack of consultation, 
misinformation and, at times, intimidation.
An inter-ministerial team began surveying land 
in Suai in 2011. The team carried out extensive 
surveying of land parcels including assessments 
of housing, land use, crops, vegetation and other 
livelihoods. While claiming to carry out extensive 
consultation the process did little to present the 
reality of the project and potential negative impacts 
to communities.
In April 2013 the state signed an agreement 
with local traditional leaders who agreed to hand 
over 1113 hectares of land to the state in return 
for 10 per cent of the profits of the supply base. 
The details of this agreement and its negotiation 
process have remained secret and are not available 
to community members and/or civil society. 
Nonetheless, the agreement is specifically referred 
to in the preamble of Law 36/2014. To date, 
community members remain unsure of their rights 
and of the nature of these agreements.
In signing an agreement with traditional leaders 
in this fashion the state drew on the legitimacy of 
traditional authority in order to access land. The 
preamble of the law validating the transmission of 
the land to the state proclaims that:
After several years of public consultations 
where the opportunities and various 
implications of the project were presented to 
members of the community, having already 
agreed to terms and conditions including 
the conservation of sacred sites or worship 
and cemeteries and having appointed one 
set of community leaders to represent the 
community the community decided to 
negotiate with the state in order to transmit 
their ownership and use of land for a period 
of one hundred and fifty years, according to 
local customary law. (RDTL Law 36/2014)
The preamble of this legislation and other 
statements evidenced in the media exemplify how 
discourses of development and good citizenship 
are used by the state to justify the project and 
to persuade communities to give up their land. 
Minister for Natural Resources Alfredo Pires stated, 
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‘the community of Kamanasa are ready to give 
their land to the government for development, 
and that the government have committed not to 
forget the communities by giving them 10% of the 
profits’ (Timor Post 12/4/2013). A local traditional 
leader, Jorge Alves, also claimed that ‘the whole 
community agrees and accepts the project … 
because we have heard that it will bring great 
benefits to our children and grandchildren’ (Timor 
Post 12/4/2013). However, civil society monitoring 
suggests that to date many community members 
hold grave concerns about the project. In October 
2012 Dili-based non-government organisation 
Luta Hamutuk (Struggle Together) stated in a 
press release that ‘the Government has kept much 
information about the Suai Supply Base hidden 
from the community and that according to Luta 
Hamutuk communities had little information about 
the process, compensation or their involvement in 
the project’ (Jornal Nacional Diario 19/10/2012). 
In September 2012 community members from 
Suku Matai (affected by the airport relocation) 
stated that ‘until now the government has not 
yet carried out any consultation or coordination 
with our people about the planned airport. Until 
now all we have heard is rumours and we have no 
certainty’ (Luta Hamutuk 2012). These debates 
indicate that there are serious questions as to the 
legitimacy of the process and the role of local 
leaders in representing their communities in 
complex land negotiations.
While these discourses suggesting that ‘good 
citizens contribute to development’ made it 
difficult for local people to speak out against the 
projects, discourses of development, citizenship 
and respect for customary authority were not 
the only means used to garner support for the 
project. At various points, key political figures were 
called in to persuade local communities of the 
benefits of the project. Local patronage networks, 
including veterans, have also been mobilised in 
support of the project, making it difficult for local 
communities to voice their opposition.
Compensation and Resettlement Deals
The benefits and negative impacts experienced by 
local men and women will depend largely on the 
type of contract resulting from the negotiation 
process and in particular the forms of compensation 
agreed upon. Theoretical frameworks suggest 
this may include outright sale of land; monetary 
compensation for use of land for a given time 
period; shares of profit or revenue from the land; 
and investments in local infrastructure, public 
goods and labour forces (Behrman et al. 2012). An 
area that Behrman and others highlight as often 
overlooked is the exact promises that are made in 
terms of the labour force agreements. They outline 
a number of potential scenarios, ranging from 
situations where the vast majority of workers for 
both unskilled and skilled labour are hired from the 
local population, to situations where the majority of 
the labour force is brought in externally.
In the Suai Supply Base case the state originally 
envisaged acquiring land through a long-term lease 
where communities were promised 10 per cent 
of the profits of the project. Due to civil society 
pressure and awareness raising on the risks of this 
approach the state eventually laid out a second 
option, offering communities US$3 per square 
metre for an outright sale of their land.
The 10 Per Cent of the Profits Deal
The original deal offers communities 10 per cent 
of the profits of the supply base in return for a 150-
year lease of their land. Civil society organisations 
carried out a number of awareness raising processes 
with community members, warning them of the 
risks of this approach and the possibility that they 
might receive nothing if the supply base proves 
financially unviable. While the vast majority of 
the population have opted for a ‘$3 per metre’ deal 
(see discussion below) a number of individuals and 
households close to the state have opted to stick 
with the 10 per cent deal. In particular, veterans 
who have shown support for the project have 
maintained that this is the best option.
However, understanding of this deal appears 
severely limited. During fieldwork in early 2015 one 
community leader explained the deal stating that his 
land was worth US$30,000 and so he would receive 
10 per cent of this value every month from the 
government for the next 150 years. While it is easy 
to read his statement as a naive misunderstanding 
of the economics of the project, his comments 
reflect the high value placed on land by rural 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm8                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Meabh Cryan
Timorese. These divergences in expectations 
have the potential to cause serious conflict once 
the reality is more clearly understood. They also 
highlight the lack of legal assistance and advice 
provided to communities during the negotiation 
phase. Similar types of land deals in the Papua New 
Guinea highlands and on Bougainville have shown 
the potential for intergenerational tensions when 
local leaders sell land for long periods of time and 
leave future generations to feel the real impact of 
landlessness (Lewis 2007; Regan 1998).
The ‘$3 Per Metre’ Deal
The ‘$3 per metre’ deal guarantees households 
US$3 per square metre for an outright sale of their 
land to the government. Under this scheme those 
losing 1 hectare of land will receive US$30,000. 
The state has refused to compensate communities 
for housing. Instead it has promised to relocate 
communities in state-built housing. Communities 
have been assured that this will be well-built ‘red 
brick’ housing rather than the same style as the 
infamous Millennium Development Goals housing 
projects.2 To date, no agreements have been 
signed. The alternative housing is to be built on 
20 × 25 metre plots in a suburban-style housing 
development. Building of these houses has just 
begun but in some cases land for these houses 
has not yet been negotiated. Communities are 
particularly worried about access to small garden 
plots and space for raising animals such as chickens 
and pigs, activities which are usually carried out 
close to the house. The new 20 × 25 metre plots 
are too small for these types of activities and it is 
unclear whether households resettled will be able 
to acquire additional land nearby.
The vast majority of affected households 
seem to have opted for the ‘$3 per metre’ deal, 
which means that households losing 1 hectare of 
land receive a payment of US$30,000 as well as 
compensation for any produce under cultivation on 
their plot. The lack of a social impact assessment 
and insufficient monitoring of the process and in 
particular the social and economic impacts of such 
large cash payments at the household level means 
that it is difficult for the state and other actors to 
develop a deep understanding of how benefits and 
negative impacts are experienced across a range of 
situations. This paper suggests that various types 
of households are being impacted in very different 
ways and that this is likely to drive inequality in 
local communities.
While promises of employment (see discussion 
below) have been made by the government there 
has been little documentation of these promises 
and it is unclear what if any guarantees will be 
enforceable by the community.
Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks: How will 
Suai Shape Up?
Based on Cernea’s impoverishment risks 
framework, the following section summarises 
the potential impacts that communities in Suai 
are likely to face given the current design and 
implementation of the project. It examines, in 
particular, the complex intersection between 
gender, class and power in the case of the Suai 
Supply Base. It attempts to illustrate the impacts 
that are felt by vulnerable households as well as 
highlighting how the experience of these impacts 
are highly gendered.
Landlessness, Homelessness and Placelessness
Cernea states that landlessness is the principal form 
of decapitalisation and pauperisation of displaced 
people who lose both natural and man-made capital 
(Cernea 2000:18). For households highly dependent 
on land and agriculture, landlessness often includes 
the loss of access to common property, forests, 
water, grazing land, spiritual sites and places of 
burial. This loss can have huge impacts not only 
on the economy of communities but also on their 
cultural and spiritual identities.
Homelessness for those affected by resettlement 
can be a short-term temporary experience or 
a chronic situation which leads to living more 
permanently in inadequate shelter. In some cases 
affected communities who cannot afford the 
cost of rebuilding homes move into temporary 
shelter thus contributing to a downward spiral 
of marginalisation and vulnerability. According 
to Cernea, ‘Resettlers’ risk of worsening housing 
conditions increases if compensation for 
demolished dwellings is paid at assessed market 
value rather than replacement value’ (Cernea 
2000:25). As well as losing their homes, resettled 
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communities often lose access to local social 
networks and experience a profound and lasting 
sense of placelessness. Tensions around land 
for relocation can add to this feeling and make 
it difficult for communities to re-establish a 
sense of place.
In the case of the Suai Supply Base, analysis 
of the impacts of these deals must look closely 
at the status and livelihoods options of various 
types of affected families. Closer analysis suggests 
highly class differentiated outcomes and impacts. 
For example, families with access to large tracts 
of land accumulated during the Indonesian and/
or Portuguese era stand to receive very large 
payments. These households are often already part 
of the local elite and have greater access to land, 
business opportunities and political connections. 
Their capacity to invest these payments into 
alternative livelihoods and business opportunities 
will be significantly greater than that of other 
households. Families with many small plots of 
land, some of which are affected and others which 
are not, will receive compensation for the plots 
that have been affected. This cash injection means 
they can potentially experiment with alternative 
livelihoods and/or invest in other assets without 
risking their food security. Families dependent on 
one small plot of agricultural land that is affected 
and a separate house that is not affected are in 
effect losing all of their cultivation and agricultural 
potential. The viability of these households 
depends on their being able to use the one-off 
cash payment to either buy alternative land for 
cultivation or invest in some sort of alternative 
non-agricultural livelihood.
Families losing their single medium-size plot of 
land which includes their house will be relocated 
to a new 20 × 25 metre plot with a government-
built house and compensated for the remaining 
land that they lose (for example (50 m × 50 m) + 
house = (20 m × 25 m) + house + $6000). The new 
plots are allocated in cramped housing estates with 
little free land on either side. While these families 
are being compensated for their housing and land 
they are being left in a highly unsustainable and 
food insecure situation where they will no longer 
have access to land for food production or raising 
animals. Most families, even those who do manage 
to save the cash compensation will not be able to 
use the remaining cash to buy any decent land plot.
A final group of affected households includes 
those that have negotiated their access to land and 
housing in multiple informal ways through family 
and kinship connections. These households are 
highly vulnerable, as the monetisation of housing 
and land values has thrown their socially negotiated 
access to shelter and land into question. In one case, 
for example, a woman living with her six children 
in her uncle’s house will lose everything because the 
compensation will go directly to her uncle who has 
said that he wants to live in the new government 
house. This woman will have to renegotiate some 
sort of solution with members of her family or 
surrounding community.
Vulnerability
The vast majority of households affected by the 
Suai Supply Base are highly vulnerable due to 
their almost exclusive dependence on subsistence 
agriculture and, as a result, are likely to be 
significantly affected by the loss of land. These 
types of households will find it difficult to establish 
alternative livelihoods.
Women are more likely than men to rely 
entirely on agricultural income and have less 
access to alternative formal income generation. 
Women are more closely bounded to the domestic 
sphere and use the home and nearby gardens 
for income generation. Women generally have 
less mobility than men and therefore are more 
seriously affected by relocation to sites further 
away from their livelihoods, original community 
or family connections. Reduced living conditions, 
distance from water sources and other resources 
drastically increase women’s workload within 
the home itself. Women’s economic autonomy 
can be seriously affected by resettlement and the 
resultant loss of livelihoods, rendering many women 
more economically dependent on male relatives 
and spouses.
Married-in men in matrilineal areas may have 
less control over access to resources and may be 
less involved in decision-making processes and 
allocation of compensation. Men who are entirely 
dependent on agriculture, uneducated and/or 
unlikely to be able to retrain or have access to new 
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forms of livelihoods may suffer increased poverty 
and a perceived loss of authority and sense of self.
Evidence suggests that the ‘$3 per metre’ deal 
has substantially changed the local land market in 
Suai. Interviews with community members suggest 
that there is now an expectation that alternative 
land will be bought by displaced households 
for US$3 per square metre as ‘this is what the 
government gave you to buy new land’. This means 
that households would have little compensation 
money left over for re-establishing livelihoods and 
production or to cover the cost of resettlement.
During recent fieldwork there were many 
stories of families who had already spent all of 
their compensation money before moving from 
their land. Community leaders and civil society 
representatives observed that many people had 
gone out and bought motorbikes, cars and other 
‘luxury’ items. As such there is a real risk that the 
money paid out in compensation will not be used 
to buy new land or establish alternative livelihoods, 
trapping families in a cycle of poverty.
Furthermore, in their research on the economic 
dimensions of domestic violence, Grenfell et al. 
(2015) find that decisions around household 
income and expenditure are highly gendered. They 
show that while women are responsible for much 
of the day-to-day expenditure on food and basic 
household items, it is men who have more control 
over larger purchases (such as motorbikes and 
cars). Given this analysis it is likely that decisions 
to purchase cars, motorbikes and other luxury 
goods are being taken by men and possible that the 
very existence of large amounts of unexpected cash 
is significantly and rapidly altering income and 
expenditure decision-making within the household.
Food Insecurity, Loss of Livelihoods and 
Joblessness
Loss of land and resettlement increase the chances 
of food insecurity. During the resettlement process 
itself a reduction in food crops is almost certain. 
In many scenarios, however, this period of food 
insecurity extends well past the transitional 
phase. In these scenarios food insecurity can 
become a chronic problem. In Timor-Leste, food 
insecurity is already a significant problem. The 
Strategic Development Plan recognises that rural 
households go on average 3.8 months of the year 
without sufficient rice or maize. In this context 
many households affected by the Suai Supply Base 
could be tipped into a highly vulnerable situation. 
For example, over 49 per cent of households in 
Camanasa are involved in crop production; over 
70 per cent are involved in keeping pigs; and over 
60 per cent in keeping chickens. Groups dependent 
on subsistence agriculture are highly dependent 
on land for food. Vulnerable households are also 
usually highly dependent on common resources 
such as forest products and wild foods.
The importance of land for food consumption 
does not appear to have been considered in 
detail by the government in the Suai Supply Base 
planning processes. To date there is no information 
to suggest that processes to monitor food insecurity 
and respond where necessary have been put 
in place. As such all hope is placed in the land 
compensation packages described above and the 
potential for local employment.
Women are often responsible for diversifying 
food crops and guaranteeing survival during the 
hungry season. Female-headed households in 
general seem to produce a higher than average 
number of food crops annually, but consume a 
lower than average number of food crops on a daily 
basis, and experience a longer than average hunger 
gap (van Dujin 2011:9–12).
In rural communities most of the labour force 
is involved in agricultural work. If the land basis 
for this type of work is lost it can result in vast 
unemployment. The Government of Timor-Leste 
has made ambitious promises of employment, and 
most of the arguments in favour of the project 
centre around the need for development and the 
need to provide employment for future generations. 
A government pamphlet circulated during the 
consultation processes suggests that the Suai Supply 
Base will provide direct employment to 300 people 
during the construction phase and 370 people 
during the operational phase; it also estimates 
that the project could indirectly provide up to 
50,000 jobs (RDTL Secretary of State for Natural 
Resources 2011).
Jobs are most likely to be filled by those who 
have had access to education and training. To date 
communities in Suai have had little or no training 
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in relevant skills. During the construction phase 
most of the skilled work has gone to foreign 
workers, with local Timorese people mainly driving 
trucks and working as manual labourers. Going 
forwards the number of jobs created and the types 
of employment available are unlikely to offer 
sufficient or appropriate compensation for local 
communities’ loss of agricultural work. Landless 
households will also be severely impacted by any 
inflation in local land and food prices. Corruption 
and collusion at the local level may result in more 
powerful and well-connected families having access 
to employment and contracts over vulnerable 
households. While we are yet to see a large increase 
in migration into Suai a number of incidents have 
occurred where disillusioned young men have 
been involved in violent outbursts of frustration at 
Indonesian company owners who they perceive as 
not honouring employment promises (Belun 2014).
Women in Timor-Leste have less access to 
formal employment than men and suffer pay-
related discrimination. Research suggests that 
women who are employed for cash are more likely 
to report having experienced physical violence 
since age 15 than women who are unemployed or 
employed but not for cash (Ministry of Finance 
Timor-Leste 2010). A rapid shift in livelihoods that 
includes women working outside the home could 
potentially result in increased cases of violence 
against women, at least in the short term.
Marginalisation, Inequality and Social 
Disarticulation
‘Marginalization occurs when families lose 
economic power and spiral on a “downward 
mobility” path’ (Cernea 2000:17). Marginalisation 
includes not only economic issues (Fernandes 
2000) but also social, cultural and psychological 
marginalisation (Appell 1986). ‘The coerciveness 
of displacement and the victimization of resettlers 
tend to depreciate resettlers’ self-image, and they 
are often perceived by host communities as a 
socially degrading stigma’ (Cernea 2000:17). These 
problems are compounded by losing access to 
education (Mahapatra 1998; Mathur 1998) and 
other public services.
Cernea describes forced displacement as 
‘tearing apart the existing social fabric, dispersing 
and fragmenting communities, dismantling 
patterns of social organization and interpersonal 
ties’ (Cernea 2000:19). The life-sustaining informal 
networks of reciprocal support are disrupted and 
there is a ‘net loss of valuable “social capital,” 
that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and 
human capital’ (Cernea 2000:23). While the more 
concrete impacts of joblessness and landlessness 
are easier to see and to quantify, Cernea argues 
that despite its long-term consequences the social 
capital lost through social disarticulation is typically 
unperceived and uncompensated by the programs 
causing it.
While the environmental impact assessment 
of the Suai Supply Base contains some discussion 
of socioeconomic impacts, no detailed social risk 
analysis or social impact assessment has been 
carried out as part of this project design and there 
seem to be few if any plans to monitor the roll out 
of the project and its social, cultural and economic 
impacts. The environmental impact assessment 
carried out by WorleyParsons states that ‘the socio-
economic assessment did not include a social 
impact assessment (SIA) impact rating system 
due to the absence of detailed project information 
required to make such an impact rating system 
feasible’ (WorleyParsons 2012:15-213).
There has been little discussion of inequality 
at the national level, with ‘development’ being 
presented only in a positive light. Rising land 
prices, distance from services and pre-existing 
vulnerabilities such as large household size or 
single parent families may be more severely affected 
by marginalisation. The different impacts of the 
project on different types of households will work 
to deepen inequality. In a post-conflict situation 
traumatised individuals and those who have been 
displaced many times due to Indonesian policies 
of transmigration (transmigrasi) or conflict will be 
more severely impacted by a sense of placelessness.
Women are often more reliant on proximity to 
these social structures than men. Research by the 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions shows 
that relocation can cut women off from sources of 
personal autonomy and social support networks 
and that the resulting social isolation can make 
women more vulnerable to domestic violence. On 
the other hand, a fall in men’s perceived status can 
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aggravate violence in those already predisposed 
(COHRE 2010). Unmarried women, female-
headed households, women who are not recognised 
as legal owners of land and/or are not included in 
negotiation processes, and women who are living 
in homes or accessing land through family or 
other socially negotiated processes will be more 
vulnerable to all of these negative impacts.
Evidence from fieldwork in early 2015 
suggested that the resettlement and shift in land 
relations is already putting significant strain on 
community and kin relations. The Xefe Suku 
(village head) of a nearby village to be affected by 
the road project described how even in his village 
where information about the road was yet to be 
disseminated families and individuals had begun 
positioning themselves in order to benefit from 
compensation, leading to disputes over land and 
inheritance where before there had been none.
One potentially positive element is the decision 
to relocate communities affected by the project to 
a common site. This could work to maintain some 
of the social and familial connections. However, 
communities may lose their connections to those 
who remain behind, and relocation may compound 
already low social status among vulnerable 
households by relocating people away from their 
social support networks, moving them to more 
remote areas further away from services and 
employment. This will disproportionately affect 
the more vulnerable households losing their homes 
under the Suai project. Members of a more socially 
vulnerable class with less access to money are less 
likely to be able to absorb or mitigate these risks.
Host communities have also questioned 
the processes by which new communities will 
be moved to their lands. A mismanagement of 
this process or, for example, a lack of proper 
preparation could easily lead to tensions between 
these groups. Cernea (2000) discusses how 
displaced people whose access to common property 
resources is not protected often begin to encroach 
on the land and resources in the host community, 
which can lead to social conflict.
Conclusion
This Discussion Paper suggests that local patterns 
of land access and control will significantly 
affect how land appropriation is experienced by 
local men and women. Theoretical frameworks 
and numerous case studies suggest that land 
acquisition and development-based displacement 
carry wide-ranging risks which have not been 
considered in the design and implementation 
of the Suai Supply Base project. Even in cases 
where inclusive processes lead to the definition 
of mutually beneficial contracts and agreements, 
the enforcement, transparency and monitoring of 
the implementation of these agreements can prove 
challenging. The situation in this case is more 
severe given that consultation and negotiation 
processes surrounding the land acquisition 
for the Suai Supply Base have been marked by 
misinformation and a lack of transparency.
The project will have significant impacts 
on local communities, potentially increasing 
their social and economic vulnerability. With 
little return on promises of employment and 
the probability that households will not be able 
to either re-establish land-based livelihoods 
or establish afresh alternative non-land-based 
livelihoods, there is a real risk that the project will 
lead to marginalisation, social disarticulation and 
impoverishment.
There are few mechanisms in place to ensure 
that the terms of agreements with the state are 
followed and limited resources are available 
for local groups to monitor and document the 
complex processes that are rolled out as a result 
of agreements. A detailed, participatory and 
transparent social impact assessment and economic 
viability study should be carried out in order to 
properly assess the potentially negative effects of 
the project on local men and women. Identified 
risks and potentially negative impacts of the 
project will need to be mitigated through better 
consultation, management, compensation and 
resettlement schemes.
This research identifies and discusses the 
potential risks of the Suai Supply Base. However, 
continued research is needed in order to document 
and examine the long-term impacts of the project 
on local men and women with a particular focus 
on the livelihoods of vulnerable households and 
groups, changing gender roles, and perceptions of 
customary land access and ownership.
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Endnotes
1 The Special Regime for the Definition of Ownership 
of Real Estate (often referred to as the Transitional 
Land Law), the Compensation Fund Law and the 
Expropriation Law.
2 The Millennium Development Goals housing project 
is a Timor-Leste government funded program where 
the government committed to building five new 
houses in every aldeia (hamlet) in Timor-Leste. The 
building process was contracted out to an Indonesian 
firm and the resulting houses were extremely low 
quality. In many areas communities have refused to 
move to the houses which are often far from services 
and are built so close together that they allow no 
room for gardens.
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